From situation calculus to fluent calculus: State update axioms as a solution to the inferential frame problem  by Thielscher, Michael
Artificial Intelligence 111 (1999) 277–299
From situation calculus to fluent calculus:
State update axioms as a solution to the inferential
frame problem
Michael Thielscher 1
Department of Computer Science, Dresden University of Technology, 01062 Dresden, Germany
Received 16 July 1998; received in revised form 7 April 1999
Abstract
Successor state axioms provide a solution to the famous Frame Problem as far as the
representational aspect is concerned. Solving in classical, monotonic logic the additional inferential
Frame Problem, on the other hand, was the major motivation for the development of the Fluent
Calculus a decade or so ago. Yet the expressiveness of the latter in comparison to the Situation
Calculus remained a largely open question until today. In this note, we derive a novel version of the
Fluent Calculus by gradually applying the principle of reification to successor state axioms in order
to address the inferential Frame Problem without losing the representational merits. Our approach
results in a fully mechanic method for the generation of state update axioms from any collection
of Situation Calculus-style effect axioms for deterministic actions, provided the actions do not have
potentially infinitely many effects. The axiomatization thus obtained is proved essentially equivalent
to the corresponding axiomatization which uses successor state axioms. Ó 1999 Elsevier Science
B.V. All rights reserved.
Keywords: Cognitive robotics; Frame problem
1. Introduction
Research in Artificial Intelligence aims at explaining and modeling intelligent behavior
in terms of computational processes [36]. The classical approach towards this goal assumes
intelligent behavior to be a result of correct reasoning on correct representations. In
turn, this reasoning is understood by means of formal logic [26]. In the research area of
Cognitive Robotics [21,38], this approach to AI is applied to a crucial aspect of intelligent
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behavior, namely, acting in a dynamic world. The famous Frame Problem [30] inevitably
arises in this context. Straightforward solutions exist only for such cases where it is possible
for an intelligent agent to acquire complete information about world states. The early
STRIPS approach [8] and modern efficient planning techniques such as [18], for instance,
are restricted to problems in which this assumption can be made. Yet most of intelligent
behavior concerns acting under partial information, and this is where the Frame Problem
becomes a fundamental challenge, which, thirty years after its discovery, is still in the
focus of attention [40]. While achieving the ultimate goal of Cognitive Robotics—building
robots equipped with high-level cognitive functions—remains a long-term research project,
advances in solving the Frame Problem have already led to a wide range of applications
for modeling dynamic systems, such as progressing databases [24], dynamic diagnosis
[31,43], agent programming [22], robot control [9], and planning [11,18,39].
Much like research in AI is concerned with both understanding and reproducing
intelligent behavior, the Frame Problem comes with two facets: a representational one,
which concerns the effort needed to specify non-effects of actions, and an inferential
one, which concerns the effort needed to actually compute these non-effects. The Fluent
Calculus, introduced in [15] and christened in [5], provides an axiomatization strategy that
particularly aims at both aspects. For a long time, this calculus has been viewed exclusively
as a close relative of approaches to the Frame Problem which appeal to non-classical logics,
namely, linearized versions of, respectively, the connection method [2,3] and Gentzen’s
sequent calculus [25]. The affinity of the Fluent Calculus and these two formalisms has
been emphasized by several formal comparison results. In [12], for example, the three
approaches have been proved to deliver equivalent solutions to a resource-sensitive variant
of STRIPS planning [8]. Yet the Fluent Calculus possesses a feature by which it stands
out against the two other frameworks: It stays entirely within classical logic. Nonetheless,
the expressiveness of the Fluent Calculus in relation to the mainstream calculi, and in
particular to the classical Situation Calculus [27], has not yet been convincingly elaborated.
The early comparison of [4], which links the aforementioned linear connection method to
the Situation Calculus, covers only a restricted form of STRIPS domains and thus concerns
a mere fraction of the calculi.
The purpose of this paper is to present new approach to the Fluent Calculus where
we start off from the Situation Calculus in the version where successor state axioms are
used as a solution to the representational aspect of the Frame Problem [34]. We illustrate
how the Fluent Calculus, or a novel version thereof, can be viewed as the result of
gradually improving this approach in view of the inferential aspect but without losing its
representational merits. The key is to gradually apply the principle of reification, which
means to use terms instead of atoms as the formal denotation of statements. Along the path
leading from successor state axioms to the Fluent Calculus lies an intermediate approach,
namely, the alternative formulation of successor state axioms described by [19], in which
atomic fluent formulas are reified. This alternative design inherits the representational
advantages and additionally addresses the inferential Frame Problem. Yet it does so only
under the important restriction that complete knowledge is available of the values of
the relevant fluents in the initial situation. The Fluent Calculus can then be viewed as a
further improvement in that it overcomes this restriction by carrying farther the principle
of reification to conjunctions of fluents.
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In the following section we illustrate by means of examples how successor state axioms
can thus be reified to what we call state update axioms. We then present a fully mechanic
method to derive state update axioms from an arbitrary collection of Situation Calculus-
style effect axioms for deterministic actions, provided the actions do not have potentially
infinitely many effects. As the main result, the axiomatization thus obtained is proved
essentially equivalent to the corresponding axiomatization using successor state axioms.
We also briefly discuss how the new Fluent Calculus allows the incorporation of two
important ontological extensions, namely, non-deterministic actions and ramifications, i.e.,
indirect effects of actions. Our results are assessed in a concluding discussion.
2. From situation calculus to fluent calculus
2.1. From successor state axioms (I) . . .
As an example which will be used throughout the paper, we will formalize the reasoning
that led to the resolution of the following little mystery:
A reliable witness reported that the murderer poured some milk into a cup of tea
before offering it to his aunt. The old lady took a drink or two and then she suddenly
fell into the armchair and died an instant later, by poisoning as has been diagnosed
afterwards. According to the witness, the nephew had no opportunity to poison the
tea beforehand. This proves that it was the milk which was poisoned and by which
the victim was murdered.
The first and fundamental challenge of formalizing reasoning about actions is to account
for the fact that most properties in the real world possess just a limited period of validity.
The Situation Calculus paradigm [30] is to attach a situation argument to such unstable
properties, also called fluents, thus limiting their range of validity to a specific situation.
The performance of an action then brings about a new situation in which certain fluents may
no longer hold. For the formalization of the pieces of commonsense knowledge relevant
to our example story, let us use the two fluents Poisoned(x, s), representing the fact that
x is poisoned in situation s, and Alive(x, s), representing the property of x being alive in
situation s. 2 Furthermore, we need the two action terms Mix(p, x, y), denoting the action
carried out by agent p of mixing x into y , and Drink(p, x), denoting that p drinks x .
Finally, let Do(a, s) be a binary function whose value denotes the situation to which
leads the performance of action a in situation s. With this signature and its semantics
the following effect axiom formalizes the fact that if x is poisoned in situation s then y ,
too, is poisoned in the situation that obtains when someone mixes x into y:
Poisoned(x, s)⊃ Poisoned(y,Do(Mix(p, x, y), s)) (1)
2 A word on the notation: Predicate and function symbols, including constants, start with a capital letter
whereas variables are in lower case, sometimes with sub- or superscripts. Free variables in formulas are assumed
universally quantified.
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This effect axiom encodes the fact that if x is poisoned then person p ceases to being
among the livings after she had drunk x:
Alive(p, s)∧ Poisoned(x, s)⊃¬Alive(p,Do(Drink(p, x), s)) (2)
These two formulas, however, do not suffice to solve the mystery due to the Frame Problem,
which has been uncovered as early as in [30]. To see why, let S0 be a constant by which
we denote the initial situation, and consider the assertion,
¬Poisoned(Tea, S0)∧ Alive(Nephew, S0)∧ Alive(Aunt, S0) (3)
Even if we added the fact that Poisoned(Milk, S0), the intended conclusion ¬Alive(Aunt,
S2) does not yet follow (where S2 = Do(Drink(Aunt,Tea),Do(Mix(Nephew,Milk,Tea),
S0))), because Alive(Aunt,Do(Mix(Nephew,Milk,Tea), S0)) is needed for axiom (2) to
apply but cannot be derived. In order to obtain this and other intuitively expected
conclusions, a number of non-effect axioms (or “frame axioms”) need to be supplied, like
the following, which says that people survive the mixing of substances:
Alive(x, s)⊃ Alive(x,Do(Mix(p, y, z), s)) (4)
Now, the Frame Problem is concerned with the problems that arise from the apparent need
for non-effect axioms like (4). Actually there are two aspects to this famous problem: The
representational Frame Problem is concerned with the proliferation of all the many frame
axioms. The inferential Frame Problem describes the computational difficulties raised by
the presence of many non-effect axioms when it comes to making inferences on the basis
of an axiomatization: Suppose that for the proof of a theorem some properties were needed
in situations other than the ones where they are given or obtained as effects of an action
(like, e.g., the property Alive(Aunt), which is given with respect to S0 but needed in the
situation Do(Mix(Nephew,Milk,Tea), S0)). Then one-by-one each of these properties has
to be carried from the one situation to the other, and past all intermediate situations, by
means of separate frame axioms.
With regard to the representational aspect of the Frame Problem, successor state
axioms [34] provide a solution which is optimal in the sense that it requires no extra frame
axioms at all. The key idea is to combine, in a determined fashion, several effect axioms
into a single one. The result, more complex than simple effect axioms like (1) and (2) but
still mentioning solely effects, is designed in such a way that it implicitly contains sufficient
information also about non-changes of fluents.
The procedure by which these axioms are set up is the following. Suppose F(Ex) is
among the fluents one is interested in. On the assumption that a fixed, finite set of actions
is considered relevant, it should be possible to specify with a single formula γ+F (Ex, a, s) all
circumstances by which F(Ex) would be caused to become true. That is to say, γ+F (Ex, a, s)
describes all actions a and conditions relative to situation s so that F(Ex) is a positive
effect of performing a in s. For example, among the actions we considered above there
is one, and only one, by which the fluent Poisoned(x) is made true, namely, mixing
some poisonous y into x . Hence an adequate definition of γ+Poisoned(x, a, s) is the formula∃p,y[a =Mix(p, y, x)∧ Poisoned(y, s)].
A dual formula, γ−F (Ex, a, s), defines the circumstances by which fluent F(Ex) is caused
to become false. In our example we consider no way to “decontaminate” a substance,
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which is why γ−Poisoned(x, a, s) should be equated with a logical contradiction. For our
second fluent, Alive(x), the situation is just the other way round: While γ+Alive(x, a, s) is
false for any instance, the appropriate definition of γ−Alive(x, a, s) is ∃y[a = Drink(x, y)∧
Alive(x, s)∧ Poisoned(y, s)].
On the basis of suitable definitions for both γ+F and γ
−
F , a complete account can be given
of how the truth value of fluent F in a new situation depends on the old one, namely,
F
(Ex,Do(a, s))≡ γ+F (Ex, a, s)∨ [F(Ex, s)∧¬γ−F (Ex, a, s)] (5)
This is the general form of successor state axioms. 3 It says that the fluent F holds in a
new situation if, and only if, it is either a positive effect of the action being performed,
or it was already true and the circumstances were not such that the fluent had to become
false. Although both γ+ and γ− talk exclusively about effects (positive and negative),
a successor state axiom, by virtue of being bi-conditional, implicitly contains all the
information needed to entail any non-change of the fluent in question. For whenever
neither γ+F (Ex, a, s) nor γ−F (Ex, a, s) is true, then (5) rewrites to the simple equivalence
F(Ex,Do(a, s))≡ F(Ex, s).
The successor state axioms for our example domain, given the formulas γ+Poisoned,
γ−Poisoned, γ
+
Alive, and γ
−
Alive, respectively, from above, are
Poisoned
(
x,Do(a, s)
)≡
∃p,y [a =Mix(p, y, x)∧ Poisoned(y, s)]∨ Poisoned(x, s) (6)
Alive
(
x,Do(a, s)
)≡
Alive(x, s)∧¬∃y [a =Drink(x, y)∧ Alive(x, s)∧ Poisoned(y, s)] (7)
The latter, for instance, suffices to conclude that Alive(Aunt, S0) is not affected by the ac-
tion Mix(Nephew,Milk,Tea)—assuming “unique names” for actions, i.e., Mix(p′, x ′, y ′) 6=
Drink(x, y). Thus we can spare the frame axiom (4).
2.2. . . . via successor state axioms (II) . . .
While successor state axioms are a good way to overcome the representational Frame
Problem since no frame axioms at all are required, the inferential aspect is still present. If
for a proof some properties, like Alive(Aunt) above, are needed in situations other than
the ones where they are given or obtained, then they have to be carried through each
intermediate situation by separate instances of successor state axioms.
However, it has been shown in [19] that by formulating successor state axioms in a way
that is somehow dual to the scheme (5), the inferential aspect can be addressed at least to
a certain extent. Central to this alternative is the representation technique of reification. It
means that properties like Poisoned(x) are formally modeled as terms, that is, Poisoned
and all other predicate symbols denoting fluents turn into function symbols. This allows
for a more flexible handling of these properties within first-order logic. Let, to this end,
3 For the sake of clarity we ignore the concept of action precondition in this paper, as it is irrelevant for our
discussion (see Section 5).
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Holds(f, s) be a binary predicate representing the fact that in situation s holds the fluent f ,
now formally a term but still meaning a proposition. This modification is justified by
a natural correspondence between a standard Situation Calculus signature and its reified
version; see Appendix A.1 for the formal details.
The key to the alternative form of successor state axioms is to devise one for each action,
and not for each fluent, which gives a complete account of the positive and negative effects
of that action. SupposeA(Ex) is an action, then it should be possible to specify with a single
formula δ+A(Ex,f, s) the necessary and sufficient conditions on f and s so that f is a positive
effect of performing A(Ex) in s. In our running example, the appropriate definition of
δ+Mix(p, x, y, f, s), say, is [f = Poisoned(y, s)] ∧Holds(Poisoned(x), s). A dual formula,
δ−A(Ex,f, s), defines the necessary and sufficient conditions on f and s so that f is a
negative effect of performing A(Ex) in s. For instance, δ−Mix(p, x, y, f, s) should be false in
any case since Mix(p, x, y) has no relevant negative effect. For a suitable axiomatization
of the action Drink(p, x) we equate δ+Drink(p, x,f, s) with a logical contradiction and
δ−Drink(p, x,f, s) with [f = Alive(p)] ∧Holds(Alive(p), s)∧Holds(Poisoned(x), s).
On the basis of δ+A and δ
−
A , a complete account can be given of which fluents hold in
situations reached by performingA, namely,
Holds
(
f,Do
(
A(Ex), s))≡ δ+A(Ex,f, s)∨ [Holds(f, s)∧¬δ−A(Ex,f, s)] (8)
That is to say, the fluents which hold after performing the action A are exactly those which
are among the positive effects or which held before and are not among the negative effects.
The reader may contrast this scheme with (5) and in particular observe the reversed roles
of fluents and actions.
Given the formulas δ+Mix(p, x, y, f, s), δ
−
Mix(p, x, y, f, s), δ
+
Drink(p, x,f, s), and δ
+
Drink
(p, x,f, s), respectively, from above, we thus obtain these two successor state axioms of
type (II):
Holds
(
f,Do
(
Mix(p, x, y), s
))≡ f = Poisoned(y)∧Holds(Poisoned(x), s)
∨ Holds(f, s) (9)
Holds
(
f,Do
(
Drink(p, x), s
))≡
Holds(f, s)∧¬[f = Alive(p)∧Holds(Alive(p), s)
∧Holds(Poisoned(x), s)] (10)
Notice that as before non-effects are not explicitly mentioned and no additional frame
axioms are required, so the representational aspect of the Frame Problem is addressed
with the alternative notion of successor state axioms just as well. The inferential advantage
of the alternative design shows if we represent the collection of fluents that are true in a
situation s by equating the atomic formula Holds(f,S) with the conditions on f to hold
in s. The following formula, for instance, constitutes a suitable description of the initial
situation in our example:
Holds(f,S0)≡ f = Alive(Nephew)∨ f = Alive(Aunt)∨ f = Poisoned(Milk) (11)
The crucial feature of this formula is that the situation argument, S0, occurs only once.
With this representational trick it becomes possible to obtain a complete description of a
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successor situation in one go, that is, by singular application of a successor state axiom.
Consider, for example, the axiom which specifies the effects of mixing, (9). If we substitute
p, x , and y by Nephew, Milk, and Tea, respectively, and s by S0, then we can replace the
sub-formula Holds(f,S0) of the resulting instance by the equivalent disjunction as given
in axiom (11). So doing yields the formula,
Holds
(
f,Do
(
Mix(Nephew,Milk,Tea), S0
))≡
f = Poisoned(Tea)∧Holds(Poisoned(Milk), S0)
∨f = Alive(Nephew)∨ f = Alive(Aunt)∨ f = Poisoned(Milk)
which all at once provides a complete description of the successor situation. Given suitable
axioms for equality, the above can be simplified, with the aid of (11), to
Holds
(
f,Do
(
Mix(Nephew,Milk,Tea), S0
))≡
f = Poisoned(Tea)∨ f = Alive(Nephew)
∨f = Alive(Aunt)∨ f = Poisoned(Milk)
The reader may verify that we can likewise infer the result of Drink(Aunt,Tea) in the new
situation by applying the appropriate instance of successor state axiom (10), which, after
simplification, yields,
Holds
(
f,Do
(
Drink(Aunt,Tea),Do
(
Mix(Nephew,Milk,Tea), S0
)))≡
f = Poisoned(Tea)∨ f = Alive(Nephew)∨ f = Poisoned(Milk)
The alternative design of successor state axioms provides a solution to both aspects of the
Frame Problem: No frame axioms at all are needed, and one instance of a single successor
state axiom suffices to carry over to the next situation all unchanged fluents. However, the
proposed method of inference relies on the very strong assumption that we can supply a
complete account of what does and what does not hold in the initial situation. Formula (11)
provides such a complete specification, because it says that any fluent is necessarily false
in S0 which does not occur to the right of the equivalence symbol. Unfortunately, it is
impossible to formulate partial knowledge of the initial state of affairs in a similarly
advantageous fashion. Of course one can start with an incomplete specification like, for
instance,
Holds(f,S0)⊂
[
f = Alive(Nephew)∨ f = Alive(Aunt)]∧ f 6= Poisoned(Tea)
which mirrors the incomplete description we used earlier (cf. formula (3)). But then the
elegant inference step from above, where we have simply replaced a sub-formula by an
equivalent, is no longer feasible. In this case one is in no way better off with the alternative
notion of successor state axioms; again separate instances need to be applied, one for each
fluent, in order to deduce what holds in a successor situation.
2.3. . . . to state update axioms
So far we have used reification to denote single properties by terms. The “meta”-
predicate Holds has been introduced which relates a reified fluent to a situation term, thus
indicating whether the corresponding property is true in the associated situation. When
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formalizing collected information about a particular situation S as to which fluents are
known to hold in it, the various corresponding atoms Holds(fi, S) are conjuncted using
the standard logical connectives. We have seen how the inferential aspect of the Frame
Problem is addressed if this is carried out in a certain way, namely, by equating Holds(f, s)
with some suitable formula Ψ . The effects of an action a can then be specified in terms
of how Ψ modifies to some formula Ψ ′ such that Holds(f,Do(a, s))≡ Ψ ′. We have also
seen, however, that this representation technique is still not sufficiently flexible in that
it is impossible to construct a first-order formula Ψ so that Holds(f,S0)≡ Ψ provides
a correct incomplete specification of S0. Yet it is possible to circumvent this drawback
by carrying farther the principle of reification, to the extent that not only single fluents
but also their conjunctions are formally treated as terms. Required to this end is a binary
function which to a certain extent reifies the logical conjunction. This function shall be
denoted by the symbol “◦” and written in infix notation, so that, for instance, the term
Alive(Nephew)◦Poisoned(Milk) is the reified version of Alive(Nephew)∧Poisoned(Milk).
The use of the function “◦” is the characteristic feature of axiomatizations which follow the
paradigm of Fluent Calculus. Appendix A.2 contains the formal details of how to obtain a
Fluent Calculus signature from a Situation Calculus one.
The union of all relevant fluents that hold in a situation is called the state (of the world)
in that situation. Recall that a situation is characterized by the sequence of actions that
led to it. While the world possibly exhibits the very same state in different situations, 4
the world is in a unique state in each situation. A function denoted by State(s) shall relate
situations s to the corresponding states, which are reified collections of fluents.
Modeling entire states as terms allows the use of variables to express mere partial
information about a situation. The following, for instance, is a correct incomplete account
of the initial situation S0 in our mystery story (cf. (3)):
∃z [State(S0)= Alive(Nephew) ◦ Alive(Aunt) ◦ z ∧
∀z′. z 6= Poisoned(Tea) ◦ z′] (12)
That is to say, of the initial state it is known that both Alive(Nephew) and Alive(Aunt) are
true and that possibly some other facts z hold, too—with the restriction that z must not
include Poisoned(Tea), of which we know it is false.
The binary function “◦” needs to inherit from the logical conjunction an important
property. Namely, the order is irrelevant in which conjuncts are given. Formally, order
ignorance is ensured by stipulating associativity and commutativity, that is, ∀x, y, z. (x ◦
y) ◦ z = x ◦ (y ◦ z) and ∀x, y. x ◦ y = y ◦ x . It is convenient to also reify the empty
conjunction, a logical tautology, by a constant, which is usually denoted by ∅ and
which satisfies ∀x. x ◦ ∅ = x . The three equational axioms, jointly abbreviated AC1, in
conjunction with the standard axioms of equality entail the equivalence of two state terms
whenever they are built up from an identical collection of reified fluents. 5 In addition,
4 If, for example, the tea was already poisoned initially, then the state of the world prior to and after
Mix(Nephew,Milk,Tea) would have been the same—in terms of which of the two liquids are poisoned and who
of our protagonists is alive.
5 The reader may wonder why function “◦” is not expected to be idempotent, i.e., ∀x. x ◦ x = x, which is yet
another property of logical conjunction. The (subtle) reason for this is given below.
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denials of equalities, such as in the second part of formula (12), need to be derivable.
This requires an extension of the standard assumption of “unique names” for fluents to
uniqueness of states, denoted by EUNA (see Appendix A.2 for the details).
The assertion that some fluent f holds (respectively, does not hold) in some situation s
can be formalized by ∃z. State(s)= f ◦ z (respectively, ∀z. State(s) 6= f ◦ z). This allows
to reintroduce the Holds predicate, now, however, not as part of the signature but as an
abbreviation for an equality sentence:
Holds(f, s) def= ∃z. State(s)= f ◦ z (13)
In this way, any Situation Calculus assertion about situations can be directly transferred to
the Fluent Calculus; e.g., the (quite arbitrary) formula
∃x.Poisoned(x, S0)∨¬Alive(Aunt, S1)
of the Situation Calculus reads
∃x.Holds(Poisoned(x), S0)∨¬Holds(Alive(Aunt), S1)
in the Fluent Calculus. Notice that Holds being a mere macro in the Fluent Calculus,
assertions about states become pure equality sentences.
Knowledge of effects of actions is formalized in terms of specifying how a current state
modifies when moving on to a next situation. The universal form of what we call state
update axiom is
∆(s)⊃ Γ [State(Do(A, s)),State(s)] (14)
where ∆(s) states conditions on s, or rather on the corresponding state, under which
the successor state is obtained by modifying the current state according to Γ . Typically,
condition ∆(s) is a compound formula consisting of Holds(f, s) atoms, as defined with
the foundational axiom (13). The component Γ defines the way the state in situation s
modifies according to the effects of the action under consideration. Actions may initiate
and terminate properties. We will discuss the design of Γ for these two cases in turn.
If an action has a positive effect, then the fluent f which becomes true simply needs
to be coupled onto the state term via State(Do(A, s)) = State(s) ◦ f . An example is the
following axiomatization of the (conditional) effect of mixing a liquid into a second one:
Holds
(
Poisoned(x), s
)∧¬Holds(Poisoned(y), s)
⊃ State(Do(Mix(p, x, y), s))= State(s) ◦ Poisoned(y)
¬Holds(Poisoned(x), s)∨Holds(Poisoned(y), s)
⊃ State(Do(Mix(p, x, y), s))= State(s)
(15)
That is to say, if x is poisoned and y is not, then the new state is obtained from the
predecessor just by adding the fluent Poisoned(y), else nothing changes at all and so the
two states are identical. Notice that neither of the two state update axioms mentions any
non-effects.
If we substitute, in the two axioms (15), p, x , and y by Nephew, Milk, and Tea,
respectively, and s by S0, then we can replace the term State(S0) in both resulting instances
by the equal term as given in axiom (12). So doing yields,
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∃z [Holds(Poisoned(Milk), S0)∧¬Holds(Poisoned(Tea), S0)
⊃ State(Do(Mix(Nephew,Milk,Tea), S0))
= Alive(Nephew) ◦ Alive(Aunt) ◦ z ◦ Poisoned(Tea)
∧ ¬Holds(Poisoned(Milk), S0)∨Holds(Poisoned(Tea), S0)
⊃ State(Do(Mix(Nephew,Milk,Tea), S0))
= Alive(Nephew) ◦ Alive(Aunt) ◦ z
∧ ∀z′. z 6= Poisoned(Tea) ◦ z′]
which implies, using the abbreviation S1 = Do(Mix(Nephew,Milk,Tea), S0) and the
correspondence (13) along with standard properties of equality and assertion (12),
∃z [Holds(Poisoned(Milk), S0)
⊃ State(S1)= Alive(Nephew) ◦ Alive(Aunt) ◦ Poisoned(Tea) ◦ z
∧ ¬Holds(Poisoned(Milk), S0)
⊃ State(S1)= Alive(Nephew) ◦ Alive(Aunt) ◦ z
∧ ∀z′. z 6= Poisoned(Tea) ◦ z′]
In this way we have obtained from an incomplete initial specification a still partial
description of the successor state, which includes the unaffected fluents Alive(Nephew) and
Alive(Aunt). These properties thus survived the application of the effects axioms without
the need to be carried over, one-by-one, by separate application of axioms.
If an action has a negative effect, then the fluent f which becomes false needs to be
withdrawn from the current state State(s). The scheme State(Do(A, s)) ◦ f = State(s)
serves this purpose. Incidentally, this scheme is the sole reason for not stipulating that “◦”
be idempotent. For if it were, then the equation State(Do(A, s)) ◦ f = State(s) would be
satisfied if State(Do(A, s)) contained f . Hence this equation would not guarantee that f
becomes false. Vital for our scheme is also to ensure that state terms do not contain any
fluent twice or more, i.e.,
∀s, x, z. State(s)= x ◦ x ◦ z⊃ x = ∅ (16)
These preparatory remarks lead us to the following axiomatization of the (conditional)
effect of drinking:
Holds
(
Alive(p), s
) ∧Holds(Poisoned(x), s)
⊃ State(Do(Drink(p, x), s)) ◦ Alive(p)= State(s)
¬Holds(Alive(p), s) ∨¬Holds(Poisoned(x), s)
⊃ State(Do(Drink(p, x), s))= State(s)
(17)
That is to say, if p is alive and x is poisoned, then the new state is obtained from the
predecessor just by terminating Alive(p), else nothing changes at all. 6
6 Actions may of course have both positive and negative effects at the same time, in which case the
component Γ of a state update axiom combines the schemes for initiating and terminating fluents. This general
case is dealt with in Section 3.
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Applying the two axioms (17) to what we have derived about the state in situation S1
yields, setting S2 = Do(Drink(Aunt,Tea), S1) and performing straightforward simplifica-
tions,
∃z [Holds(Poisoned(Milk), S0)
⊃ State(S2) ◦ Alive(Aunt)= Alive(Nephew) ◦ Alive(Aunt) ◦ Poisoned(Tea) ◦ z
∧¬Holds(Poisoned(Milk), S0)
⊃ State(S2)= Alive(Nephew) ◦ Alive(Aunt) ◦ z
]
This partial description 7 of the successor state again includes every persistent fluent
without having applied separate deduction steps for each. The concept of state update
axioms thus provides a solution to both the representational and the inferential aspect of
the Frame Problem which is capable of dealing with incomplete knowledge about world
states.
3. The general method
Having illustrated the design and use of state update axioms by example, in this section
we will present a general, fully mechanic procedure by which is generated a suitable
set of state update axioms from a given collection of Situation Calculus effect axioms,
like (1) and (2). One restriction turns out necessary for our method to be feasible, namely,
actions may not potentially have infinitely many effects, or so-called open effects. An
example of a violation of this assumption is the following effect axiom, which specifies
an open effect: ∀x, y, s. Bomb(x)∧ Nearby(x, y, s)⊃ Destroyed(y,Do(Explodes(x), s)).
Even after instantiating the action expression Explodes(x) and the situation term s, the
effect literal still carries a variable, y , so that the action may have an infinite number of
effects. State update axioms for actions with open effects are discussed in Section 5.
We consider a standard Situation Calculus signature, which is a many-sorted first-order
language that includes the sort sit for situations. Positive effect specifications are of the
following form, where A denotes an action and F a fluent:
ε+A,F (Ex, s)⊃ F
(Ey,Do(A(Ex), s)) (18)
Here, ε is a first-order formula whose free variables are among Ex, s; and Ey contains only
variables from Ex . Notice that it is the very last restriction which ensures that the effect
specification does not describe an open effect: Except for the situation term, all arguments
of the effect F are bound by the action term A(Ex). Likewise, negative effect specifications
are of the form,
ε−A,F (Ex, s)⊃¬F
(Ey,Do(A(Ex), s)) (19)
where again ε is a first-order formula whose free variables are among Ex, s and where Ey
contains only variables from Ex . Our two effect axioms at the beginning of Section 2.1, for
7 Which, since State(S2)= Alive(Nephew) ◦Alive(Aunt) ◦ z implies that Holds(Alive(Aunt), S2), leads directly
to the resolution of the murder mystery: Along with the statement of the witness, ¬Holds(Alive(Aunt), S2), the
formula above logically entails the explanation that Holds(Poisoned(Milk), S0).
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instance, fit this scheme, namely, by equating ε+Mix,Poisoned(p, x, y, s) with Poisoned(x, s)
and ε−Drink,Alive(p, x, s) with Alive(p, s)∧ Poisoned(x, s). We assume that a given set E of
effect axioms is consistent in that for all A and F the assumption of unique names entails,
¬∃Ex, s[ε+A,F (Ex, s)∧ ε−A,F (Ex, s)] (20)
Fundamental for any attempt to solve the Frame Problem is the assumption that a given
set of effect axioms is complete in the sense that all relevant effects of all involved actions
are specified. 8 Our concern, therefore, is to derive state update axioms from a given set of
effect specifications in such a way that the assumption of completeness is suitably reflected
by the resulting axioms. The following instance of scheme (14) is the general form of state
update axioms for deterministic actions with only direct effects:
∆(s)⊃ State(Do(A, s)) ◦ ϑ− = State(s) ◦ ϑ+
where ϑ− are the negative effects and ϑ+ the positive effects, respectively, of action A
under condition∆(s). The main challenge for the design of these state update axioms is to
make sure that condition∆ is strong enough for the equation in the consequent to be sound.
Neither must ϑ+ include a fluent that already holds in situation s (for this would contradict
the foundational axiom about multiple occurrences, (16)), nor should ϑ− specify a negative
effect that is already false in s (for then EUNA implies that the equation be false). This is
the motivation behind Steps 1 and 2 of the procedure below. The final and main Step 3
reflects the fact that actions with conditional effects require more than one state update
axiom, each applying in different contexts:
(1) Rewrite to ε+A,F (Ex, s) ∧ ¬F(Ey, s) ⊃ F(Ey,Do(A(Ex), s)) each positive effect axiom
of the form (18).
(2) Similarly, rewrite to ε−A,F (Ex, s) ∧ F(Ey, s) ⊃ ¬F(Ey,Do(A(Ex), s)) each negative
effect axiom of the form (19).
(3) For each action A, let the following n> 0 axioms be all effect axioms thus rewritten
(positive and negative) concerning A:
ε1(Ex, s)⊃ F1
(Ey1,Do(A(Ex), s)), . . . , εm(Ex, s)⊃ Fm(Eym,Do(A(Ex), s))
εm+1(Ex, s)⊃¬Fm+1
(Eym+1,Do(A(Ex), s)), . . . ,
εn(Ex, s)⊃¬Fn
(Eyn,Do(A(Ex), s))
For any pair of subsets I+ ⊆ {1, . . . ,m}, I− ⊆ {m+ 1, . . . , n} (including the empty
ones) introduce the following state update axiom: 9∧
i∈I+∪I−
HOLDS
(
εi(Ex, s)
)∧ ∧
j /∈I+∪I−
HOLDS
(¬εj (Ex, s))
⊃ State(Do(A(Ex), s)) ◦ ϑ I− = State(s) ◦ ϑ I+ (21)
8 If actions have additional, indirect effects, then this gives rise to the so-called Ramification Problem; see
Section 4.2.
9 Below, we use the notation HOLDS(Ψ ) to denote the formula that results from transforming a Situation
Calculus-style formula Ψ into its reified counterpart, which is obtained by replacing each fluent atom P (Eτ ,σ ) by
Holds(P (Eτ), σ ).
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where ϑ I− is the term F1 ◦· · ·◦Fk if {F1, . . . ,Fk} = {Fi(Eyi): i ∈ I−} and, similarly,
ϑ I+ is the term F1 ◦ · · · ◦ Fk if {F1, . . . ,Fk} = {Fi(Eyi): i ∈ I+}. 10
Step 3 blindly considers all combinations of positive and negative effects. Some of the
state update axiom thus obtained may have inconsistent antecedent, in which case they
can be removed. To illustrate the interaction of context-dependent positive and negative
effects, we apply our procedure to two effect axioms which encode the Yale Shooting
scenario [14]: 11
Loaded(x, s)⊃Dead(y,Do(Shoot(x, y), s))
true⊃¬Loaded(x,Do(Shoot(x, y), s))
After rewriting according to Steps 1 and 2, Step 3 produces four state update axioms, viz.
¬[Holds(Loaded(x), s)∧¬Holds(Dead(y), s)]∧¬[true∧Holds(Loaded(x), s)]
⊃ State(Do(Shoot(x, y), s)) ◦ ∅ = State(s) ◦ ∅
¬[Holds(Loaded(x), s)∧¬Holds(Dead(y), s)]∧ true∧Holds(Loaded(x), s)
⊃ State(Do(Shoot(x, y), s)) ◦ Loaded(x)= State(s) ◦ ∅
Holds
(
Loaded(x), s
)∧¬Holds(Dead(y), s)∧¬[true∧Holds(Loaded(x), s)]
⊃ State(Do(Shoot(x, y), s)) ◦ ∅ = State(s) ◦Dead(y)
Holds
(
Loaded(x), s
)∧¬Holds(Dead(y), s)∧ true∧Holds(Loaded(x), s)
⊃ State(Do(Shoot(x, y), s)) ◦ Loaded(x)= State(s) ◦Dead(y)
Logical simplification of the premises of the first two axioms yields,
¬Holds(Loaded(x), s)⊃ State(Do(Shoot(x, y), s))= State(s)
Holds
(
Dead(y), s
)∧Holds(Loaded(x), s)
⊃ State(Do(Shoot(x, y), s)) ◦ Loaded(x)= State(s)
The third axiom can be abandoned because of an inconsistent antecedent, while the fourth
axiom simplifies to
Holds
(
Loaded(x), s
)∧¬Holds(Dead(y), s)
⊃ State(Do(Shoot(x, y), s)) ◦ Loaded(x)= State(s) ◦Dead(y)
(The interested reader may verify that applying the general procedure to our effect
axioms (1) and (2) yields four axioms which, after straightforward simplification, turn
out to be (15) and (17), respectively.)
10 Thus ϑ I− contains the negative effects and ϑ I+ the positive effects specified in the update axiom. If either
set is empty then the respective term is the unit element, ∅.
11 Below, the fluents Loaded(x) and Dead(y) mean that gun x is loaded and animal y is dead, respectively, and
Shoot(x, y) represents the action of shooting with x at y.
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The following primary theorem for the Fluent Calculus shows that the resulting set of
state update axioms correctly reflects the effect axioms if the fundamental completeness
assumption is made (see Appendix A.3 for a proof).
Theorem 1. Consider a finite set E of effect axioms which complies with the assumption
of consistency (cf. (20)), and let SUA be the set of state update axioms for E . SupposeM
is a model of SUA ∪ {(13),(16)} ∪ EUNA, 12 and consider a fluent term F(Eτ ), an action
term A( Eρ ), and a situation term σ . ThenM |=Holds(F (Eτ ),Do(A( Eρ ),σ )) iff
(1) M |= ε+A,F ( Eρ,σ), for the instance
ε+A,F ( Eρ,σ)⊃ F
(Eτ ,Do(A( Eρ ),σ ))
of some axiom in E ;
(2) orM |=Holds(F (Eτ ), σ ) and there is no instance
ε−A,F ( Eρ,σ)⊃¬F
(Eτ ,Do(A( Eρ ),σ ))
of an axiom in E such thatM |= ε−A,F ( Eρ,σ).
Our theorem coincides with the main result of [34] concerning the collection of
successor state axioms obtained from a given set of positive and negative effect
specifications. This shows that provided no open effects occur, the state update axioms,
by which is solved the additional inferential Frame Problem, express essentially the same
as successor state axioms.
4. Extensions
In the following we briefly discuss how the concept of state update axioms is amenable to
two important ontological extensions, namely, non-deterministic actions and ramifications.
4.1. Non-deterministic actions
Non-deterministic actions can be very elegantly specified by means of disjunctive
state update axioms ∆(s) ⊃ Γ [State(Do(A, s)),State(s)], where Γ is a disjunction of
the possible effects, i.e., state updates, of the respective action. The following two
axioms, for instance, specify the alternative outcomes of tossing a coin x in terms of the
fluent Heads(x):
¬Holds(Heads(x), s)⊃ State(Do(Toss(x), s))= State(s) ◦Heads(x)
∨
State
(
Do
(
Toss(x), s
))= State(s)
Holds
(
Heads(x), s
)⊃ State(Do(Toss(x), s)) ◦Heads(x)= State(s)
∨
State
(
Do
(
Toss(x), s
))= State(s)
12 Recall that EUNA, the extended unique names assumption, axiomatizes equality and inequality of terms with
the function “◦”.
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That is, if Heads(x) is false in situation s, then it may or may not become true by
performing Toss(x); whereas if it is true, then it may or may not become false. Generally,
disjunctive state update axioms have the same flavor as disjunctions of successor state
axioms to encode non-deterministic actions in the Situation Calculus [23].
4.2. Ramifications
The Ramification Problem [10] denotes the problem of handling indirect effects of
actions. These effects are not explicitly represented in action specifications but follow
from general laws, so-called state constraints, describing dependencies among fluents.
Approaches based on the idea of causal propagation [35,42] are the most general solution
to the Ramification Problem known today. The theory of causal relationships [42,44]
furnishes a ready approach to accommodate indirect effects in state update axioms. As an
example, we consider the extension of the Yale Shooting domain by the state constraint
Walking(y) ⊃ ¬Dead(y). The state constraint itself is straightforwardly axiomatized
as,
Holds
(
Walking(y), s
)⊃¬Holds(Dead(y), s) (22)
As argued in [1], this constraint gives rise to the indirect effect that the turkey stops
walking as soon as it is shot. More precisely, if both Walking(Turkey) and ¬Dead(Turkey)
happen to be true when an action is performed which causes Dead(Turkey), then this
action additionally causes ¬Walking(Turkey). Such indirect effects can be accounted for
by the successive application of so-called causal relationships. Their axiomatization is
based on defining a predicate Causes(state, effects,new_state,new_effects), which means
that in the current state state the occurred effects effects give rise to an additional,
indirect effect resulting in the updated state new_state and the updated current effects
new_effects. In this way, the indirect effect in the example is accommodated via the
following definition:
Causes(state, effects,new_state,new_effects)≡
∃z. effects=Dead(y) ◦ z∧
new_state ◦Walking(y)= state∧
new_effects= effects ◦−Walking(y)
where a sub-term −F represents the occurrence of a negative effect. From this definition
we can derive, for instance, that whenever the turkey is dead but still walking after an action
has occurred with the effects −Loaded(Gun) and Dead(Turkey), then −Walking(Turkey)
is additionally caused; that is, formally,
Causes
(
Dead(Turkey) ◦Walking(Turkey) ◦ z, −Loaded(Gun) ◦Dead(Turkey),
Dead(Turkey) ◦ z, −Loaded(Gun) ◦Dead(Turkey) ◦−Walking(Turkey))
State update axioms which account for indirect effects are of the form,
∆(s)⊃ [z ◦ ϑ− = State(s) ◦ ϑ+ ⊃ Ramify(z, −ϑ− ◦ ϑ+, State(Do(A, s)))] (23)
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where
• ϑ− are the negative direct effects;
• ϑ+ are the positive direct effects;
• Ramify(state, effects,new_state) means that the successive application of (zero or
more) causal relationships to state state and effects effects results in state new_state.
As in [42], the definition of the predicate Ramify requires a standard second-order
axiom to characterize the reflexive and transitive closure of Causes. The axioms which
encode the underlying state constraints, such as (22), guarantee that the overall resulting
state, State(Do(A, s)) in (23), satisfies all constraints. In this way, the state update
axiom,
Holds
(
Loaded(x), s
)∧¬Holds(Dead(y), s)
⊃ z ◦ Loaded(x)= State(s) ◦Dead(y)
⊃ Ramify(z,−Loaded(x) ◦Dead(y),State(Do(Shoot(x, y), s)))
in conjunction with the axioms above, including the definition of Ramify in terms
of Causes, entails Holds(Loaded(Gun), S0) ⊃ ¬Holds(Walking(Turkey),Do(Shoot(Gun,
Turkey), S0)).
5. Discussion
Starting with the concept of successor state axioms as a solution to the representational
aspect of the Frame Problem, we have derived a novel version of the Fluent Calculus
by gradually applying the principle of reification in order to solve the inferential Frame
Problem. The intermediate approach, an alternative form of successor state axioms, roots
in the axiomatization technique of [20] in a similar way as the foundations for the original
successor state axioms were laid in [13,37]. In fact, the conjunction of all axioms (8) for
a domain plus a complete specification of an initial state in the flavor of axiom (11) is
equivalent to Clark’s completion [7] of the corresponding logic programming clauses used
in [20]. A restricted version of the second form of successor state axioms has previously
been used in [28] to axiomatize STRIPS domains using the Situation Calculus. The version
of the Fluent Calculus we arrived at in this paper differs considerably from its roots [15],
e.g., in that it exploits the full expressive power of first-order logic. In so doing it is much
closer to the variant introduced in [42], but still novel is the notion of state update axioms.
In particular the new function State(s) lends more elegance to effect specifications and at
the same time emphasizes the relation to the Situation Calculus.
We have demonstrated the expressive power of state update axioms by proving that,
much like in [34], a suitable collection of these axioms can be automatically derived from
a complete (with respect to the relevant fluents and actions) set of single effect axioms,
provided actions have no open effects. A state update axiom formalizes an equational
relation between the states at two consecutive situations. These equations being perfectly
symmetric, a state update axiom can be used equally for reasoning forward and backward
in time. The versatility of the Fluent Calculus promises it to be applicable to more complex
problems of reasoning about actions. We have substantiated this expectation by illustrating,
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how the concept of state update axioms is applicable to problems which involve non-
deterministic actions and actions with indirect effects.
The problem of action preconditions has been ignored in this paper for the sake of
clarity. Their dealing with requires no special treatment in the new Fluent Calculus since
each Situation Calculus assertion about what holds in a situation corresponds directly to
a Fluent Calculus assertion via the fundamental relation (13). The restriction to actions
without open effects, on the other hand, is inevitable if one aims at an explicit description
of the direct effects. Open effects can only implicitly be specified in state update axioms,
as is done in this example axiom:
∀s, x,ϑ+. Bomb(x)⊃ ∀f,y
[
f =Destroyed(y)∧Holds(Nearby(x, y), s)∧¬Holds(f, s)
≡ ∃z. ϑ+ = f ◦ z
]
⊃ State(Do(Explodes(x), s))= State(s) ◦ ϑ+

in which the positive effect of the action, ϑ+, is defined rather than explicitly given.
It lies in the nature of open effects that a suitable state update axiom provides just an
implicit definition of the required update and so does no longer solve the inferential Frame
Problem at the point where such an action is performed—but of course it still covers the
representational aspect.
Moving from Situation Calculus to Fluent Calculus involves the introduction of the
equational theory AC1. While the simple addition of equality axioms may constitute
a considerable handicap for theorem proving, a variety of efficient constraint solving
algorithms have been developed for the particular equational theory needed for the
function “◦”; for a survey see [32]. Solving the inferential Frame Problem by means of
state update axioms relies on the fact that the latter always cover the entire change an action
causes. The tradeoff is that the number of update axioms is, in the worst case, exponentially
larger than the number of single effect axioms. However, this is perfectly acceptable as
long as we can assume that actions have very few effects compared to the overall number of
fluents. This assumption, in fact, plays an almost axiomatic role in commonsense reasoning
about actions:
Yet, in practice, people teach each other rather quickly what actions normally do
to the world, people predict the consequences of any given action without much
hustle, and AI researchers are writing languages for actions as if it is a God given
truth that action representations should be compact, elegant and meaningful. Why?
[. . .] Because the actions we normally invoke in common reasoning tasks are local
surgeries. The world consists of a huge number of autonomous and invariant linkages
[. . .], each corresponding to a physical process that constrains the behavior of
relatively small groups of variables [33, p. 3].
The essential motivation for using the Fluent Calculus is that state update axioms provide
a solution not only to the representational Frame Problem, since they talk exclusively about
effects, but also to the inferential Frame Problem, since one such axiom always specifies
the entire relation between two consecutive situations. The inferential aspect of the Frame
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Problem concerns each single fluent needed by the proof of a theorem in a situation other
than the one where it is given or arises. In the Situation Calculus, for instance, this holds
regardless of whether successor state axioms are used for reasoning forward in time or as
a basis for regression [34]. If all fluents are needed in exactly the situations they are given
or obtained, then the inferential Frame Problem causes no computational burden at all and
the presence of EUNA in the Fluent Calculus only adds to the computational complexity.
However, the more fluents need to be carried unchanged through many intermediate
situations, the more valuable can be a solution to the inferential Frame Problem. It remains
a topic for future research to determine for which problem classes and precisely to what
extent the solution to the inferential Frame Problem offered by the Fluent Calculus leads to
gains in efficiency when modeling dynamic systems. This includes the hope that the Fluent
Calculus can be employed to improve current techniques of planning by local search along
the line of [18], which just as well have to cope with the Frame Problem and, to this end,
employ techniques on which also successor state axioms are based.
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Appendix A. Technical details
Appendix A.1 contains the formal underpinnings and justification for the alternative
form of successor state axioms of Section 2.2. Appendix A.2 contains the formal
underpinnings of the Fluent Calculus. Appendix A.3 contains the proof of the primary
theorem.
A.1. Reification (I)
Let Σ be a standard signature for Situation Calculus, that is, a many-sorted first-order
language with equality which includes the special sort sit for situations. Some predicate
symbols in Σ are fluent denotations; these are of arity > 1 with the last argument being of
sort sit. The corresponding reification signature ΣHolds is obtained from Σ by
(1) replacing each (n + 1)-place predicate symbol which denotes a fluent and whose
argument is of sort sorts× sit by an n-place function symbol whose argument is of
sort sorts;
(2) adding a sort fluent, to which belong all well-sorted terms with leading function
symbol obtained in Step 1;
(3) adding the binary predicate Holds, whose argument is of sort fluent× sit.
The additional sort fluent in signatureΣHolds allows formulas like ∃f.Holds(f,S0), which
have no natural correspondence in Σ . We will discard such cases and only consider what
we call conventional formulas over ΣHolds, in which no variables of sort fluent occur.
Then each formula φ over Σ has a natural, conventional counterpart over ΣHolds, which
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is obtained by replacing, in φ, each fluent atom P(Eτ , σ ) by Holds(P (Eτ ), σ ). Conversely,
each conventional ψ overΣHolds corresponds to a formula overΣ .
This way of reifying fluents is justified (a) by the observation that each interpretation for
the original signature Σ corresponds to some interpretation for the modified ΣHolds and
vice versa, and (b) by the fact that corresponding interpretations interpret corresponding
formulas alike. To prove this formally, we define two interpretations I, ζ and J , ξ for Σ
and ΣHolds, respectively, as corresponding iff the following holds:
(1) The domains of I and J are identical except for arbitrary domain elements of sort
fluent additionally contained in the domain of J .
(2) The variable assignments ζ and ξ are identical except for arbitrary additional
assignments to variables of sort fluent in ξ .
(3) I and J agree on the interpretation of the predicate symbols in Σ which do not
denote a fluent.
(4) I and J agree on the interpretation of the function symbols in Σ .
(5) Whenever P is an (n + 1)-place fluent denotation in Σ and Ed, dn+1 are domain
elements of the right sort (that is, in particular, dn+1 is of sort sit), then the
following holds: Let d be the domain element of sort fluent which results from
applying to Ed the n-place function by which J interprets P . Then ( Ed, dn+1) ∈ PI
iff (d, dn+1) ∈HoldsJ .
Now, suppose I, ζ is an interpretation for Σ , then a corresponding interpretation J ,
ξ for ΣHolds can be obtained by adding a domain element of sort fluent for each (n+ 1)-
place fluent denotation P and each n-tuple Ed of the right sort, and by setting the functional
assignment PJ and the relation HoldsJ in the right way. Conversely, each interpretation
J , ξ for ΣHolds can be mapped onto a corresponding interpretation I, ζ for Σ . The
significance of this observation lies in the fact that corresponding interpretations interpret
corresponding formulas alike:
Proposition A.1. LetΣ be a signature andΣHolds the corresponding reification signature.
Let I, ζ be an interpretation for Σ and J , ξ an interpretation for ΣHolds so that the two
correspond. Furthermore, let φ be formula over Σ and ψ a conventional formula over
ΣHolds so that the two correspond. Then I, ζ |= φ iff J , ξ |=ψ .
Proof. If A is a non-fluent atom over Σ , then I, ζ |= A iff J , ξ |= A since the two
interpretations agree on all relevant variable assignments, on all non-fluent predicate
symbols, and on all function symbols in Σ . If P(Eτ , σ ) is a fluent atom of Σ , then
I, ζ |= P(Eτ , σ ) iff J , ξ |= Holds(P (Eτ ), σ ) according to the definition of corresponding
interpretations. Likewise, if Holds(P (Eτ ), σ ) is a conventional atom over ΣHolds, then
I, ζ |= P(Eτ , σ ) iff J , ξ |= Holds(P (Eτ ), σ ). With these three base cases the claim follows
by straightforward structural induction. 2
It is an immediate consequence of these results that a set of formulas over Σ entails a
formula over this signature if and only if the set of corresponding formulas over ΣHolds
entails the corresponding formula, and vice versa provided only conventional formulas
overΣHolds are considered.
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A.2. Reification (II)
LetΣ be a standard signature for Situation Calculus as above. The corresponding Fluent
Calculus signature ΣFC is obtained from Σ by
(1) replacing each (n + 1)-place predicate symbol which denotes a fluent and whose
argument is of sort sorts× sit by an n-place function symbol whose argument is of
sort sorts;
(2) adding the constant ∅ and the binary function symbol ◦;
(3) adding a sort fluent, to which belong all well-sorted terms with leading function
symbol obtained in step 1, and a sort state, which is the least set to which belong the
constant ∅, each fluent, and each t1 ◦ t2 where t1, t2 are of sort state;
(4) adding the unary function State, whose argument is of sort sit.
Notice that a Fluent Calculus signature does not include the predicate Holds, which is
merely a macro standing for an equality sentence (cf. (13)).
Fundamental for any Fluent Calculus axiomatization is the axiom set EUNA (the
extended unique names-assumption) [16]. Its definition relies on a complete AC1-
unification algorithm (see, e.g., [6]), and it comprises the following equational axioms:
(1) The axioms AC1 for ◦ and ∅,
(x ◦ y) ◦ z=x ◦ (y ◦ z)
x ◦ y=y ◦ x
x ◦ ∅=x
All variables are universally quantified.
(2) For any two terms t1 and t2 of sort other than state and with variables Ex,
(a) if t1 and t2 are not unifiable, then
¬∃Ex. t1 = t2
(b) if t1 and t2 are unifiable with mgu θ , then
∀Ex [ t1 = t2 ⊃ ∃Ey. θ=]
where Ey denotes the variables which occur in θ= but not in Ex . 13
(3) For any two terms t1 and t2 of sort state and with variables Ex,
(a) if t1 and t2 are not AC1-unifiable, then
¬∃Ex. t1 = t2
(b) if t1 and t2 are AC1-unifiable with the complete set of unifiers cUAC1(t1, t2),
then
∀Ex
[
t1 = t2 ⊃
∨
θ∈cUAC1(t1,t2)
∃Ey. θ=
]
where Ey denotes the variables which occur in θ= but not in Ex .
13 By θ= we denote the equational formula x1 = r1 ∧ · · · ∧ xn = rn constructed from the substitution θ =
{x1\r1, . . . , xn\rn}.
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The axioms of item 3, in conjunction with the standard uniqueness of names-assumption
in item 2, ensure that EUNA is unification complete [17,41] with respect to state terms and
the equational theory AC1. The latter axiomatizes the arbitrary re-arranging of the fluent
terms that occur in a state term; hence, the following observation, which will be needed
below, is a consequence of EUNA being AC1-unification complete:
Observation A.2. Let I, ζ be an interpretation for ΣFC such that I, ζ |= EUNA, and
consider two state terms t1 and t2. Then I, ζ |= ∃z. t1 = t2 ◦ z iff each fluent term occurs
n>m-times in t1 if it occurs m> 1-times in t2.
A.3. Proof of Theorem 1
We are now prepared to prove our main result.
Theorem 1. Consider a finite set E of effect axioms which complies with the assumption
of consistency (cf. (20)), and let SUA be the set of state update axioms for E . Suppose
M is a model of SUA∪ {(13), (16)} ∪ EUNA, and consider a fluent term F(Eτ ), an action
term A( Eρ ), and a situation term σ . ThenM |=Holds(F (Eτ ),Do(A( Eρ ),σ )) iff
(1) M |= ε+A,F ( Eρ,σ), for the instance ε+A,F ( Eρ,σ)⊃ F(Eτ ,Do(A( Eρ ),σ )) of some axiom
in E ;
(2) orM |=Holds(F (Eτ ), σ ) and there is no instance
ε−A,F ( Eρ,σ)⊃¬F
(Eτ ,Do(A( Eρ),σ ))
of an axiom in E such thatM |= ε−A,F ( Eρ,σ).
Proof. According to (13),M |=Holds(F (Eτ ),Do(A( Eρ ),σ )) stands for
M |= ∃z[State(Do(A( Eρ),σ ))= F(Eτ ) ◦ z]
From Observation 3 it follows that the latter holds iff F(Eτ ) is contained in State(Do(A
( Eρ ),σ )). The state update axioms (21) in SUA for action A(Ex) are designed in such a way
that each distribution of truth values of the members of {HOLDS(εi(Ex, s)): 1 6 i 6 n}
occurs as antecedent of one, and only one, axiom. Hence, there is a unique state update
axiom whose antecedent, if instantiated with A( Eρ) and σ , is true in M. We distinguish
three cases:
(1) If E contains some ε+A,F (Ex, s)⊃ F(Ey,Do(A(Ex), s)) such thatM |= ε+A,F ( Eρ,σ) and{Ex \ Eρ} binds Ey to Eτ , and ifM |= ¬Holds(F (Eτ ), σ ), then F(Ey) ∈ {Fi(Eyi)}i∈I+ (with
respect to the state update axiom which applies; cf. (21)). Moreover, consistency of
E ensures that F(Ey) /∈ {Fi(Eyi)}i∈I− . Hence, F(Eτ ) occurs in ϑI+ but not in ϑI− and
so is contained in State(Do(A( Eρ ),σ )) according to Observation A.2.
(2) If E contains some ε−A,F (Ex, s) ⊃ ¬F(Ey,Do(A(Ex), s)) such that M |= ε−A,F ( Eρ,σ)
and {Ex \ Eρ} binds Ey to Eτ , and if M |= Holds(F (Eτ ), σ ), then F(Ey) ∈ {Fi(Eyi)}i∈I− .
Moreover, consistency of E ensures that F(Ey) /∈ {Fi(Eyi)}i∈I+ . Hence, F(Eτ ) occurs
in ϑI− but not in ϑI+ and so is not contained in State(Do(A( Eρ ),σ )) since
it does not occur twice in State(σ ) according to foundational axiom (16) and
Observation A.2.
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(3) If no effect axiom of E at all for A( Eρ ) and F(Eτ ) applies in situation σ , or if a
positive one applies with F(Eτ ) being contained in State(σ ) already, or a negative
one applies with F(Eτ ) not present in State(σ ) already, then F(Eτ ) does not occur
in {Fi(Eyi)}i∈I+{Ex \ Eρ} nor in {Fi(Eyi)}i∈I−{Ex \ Eρ}. Hence, F(Eτ ) does not occur in
ϑI+ nor in ϑI− and so is contained in State(Do(A( Eρ ),σ )) iff so it is in State(σ )
according to Observation A.2. 2
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